Editorials are the opinion of the members of the Editorial Board. Editorials are by their nature opinionated, and are not intended to be "neutral." The Editors attempt to be fair in their analyses, but they are expressing their own opinions. The Editors invite responses from readers, especially if they disagree with an opinion expressed in an editorial.
-
The Tibetan and Chinese Prime Ministers Address the Self-Immolations
By the Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review In a strange coincidence, February 14 saw articles on both Lobsang Sangay, the Tibetan prime minister in exile, and Wen Jiabao ...
Posted Feb 22, 2012 8:56 AM by The Tibetan Political Review
-
Deciphering Chinese Propaganda on Tibet
By the Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review
With the self-immolation crisis spreading and Tibet under undeclared martial law, Chinese propaganda can be unintentionally revealing. It shows what ...
Posted Feb 13, 2012 7:03 AM by The Tibetan Political Review
-
What Future for the Sino-Tibetan Dialogue?
By the Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review
“What is the sound of one hand clapping?” This Zen Buddhist koan is sometimes cited by those who follow the ups ...
Posted Feb 6, 2012 6:50 AM by The Tibetan Political Review
-
Canada Secretly Saw Tibet as "Qualified for Recognition as an Independent State"
By the Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review
Declassified documents from 1950 through the 1960s show that Canada considered Tibet to be “qualified for recognition as an independent state ...
Posted Jan 24, 2012 9:09 AM by The Tibetan Political Review
-
Dim Sum Surprise: Why the Hong Kong Model Won't Save Tibet
By the Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review Proponents of the Middle Way policy have recently been placing increased hope on Chinese law. Exhibit A in this argument is ...
Posted Jan 3, 2012 7:22 AM by The Tibetan Political Review
-
China's Crackdown in Tibet Caught on Camera
By the Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review Recently, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile released a video on its official online TV site showing a 2008 Chinese police raid ...
Posted Dec 22, 2011 6:44 AM by The Tibetan Political Review
-
Reviewing the First 100 Days of the New Tibetan Administration
By the Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review Speaking in Paris on November 26, 2011, the Kalon Tripa, Lobsang Sangay, commented that the first 100 days of his administration ...
Posted Dec 28, 2011 5:41 AM by The Tibetan Political Review

Nepal explicitly recognized Tibet as an independent country. [READ MORE]
Important questions about the revisions to the TIbetan Charter. [READ MORE]
The significance of the 2011 Kalon Tripa election results. [READ MORE]
The candidates' views on Tibetan autonomy within the PRC [READ MORE]
We compare the candidates' positions on strengthening the Tibetan government-in-exile, where the Kalon Tripa has an important role. [READ MORE]
We compare the candidates' positions on strengthening ties between Tibetans inside and outside of Tibet. [READ MORE]
Fortunately, both major Kalon Tripa candidates have clearly stated their policies on this important issue. [READ MORE]
Unfortunately, Tibetan voters are in the dark on the sources of campaign funds. [READ MORE]
We are troubled by the personal attacks emerging in the 2011 Tibetan election. [READ MORE]
In this editorial, we examine key aspects of Tethong's policy on possibly the most important issue facing the electorate: the future course of the Tibetan struggle. [READ MORE]
Widespread campaigning through the internet is generally a positive development, but the website for Kalsang Phuntsok Godrukpa perfectly illustrates some drawbacks as well. [READ MORE]
The Editorial Board has attempted to summarize the job descriptions for these two positions. It is our hope that clarity on these offices' responsibilities will help voters better evaluate the candidates. [READ MORE]
Lobsang Jinpa clearly set out some of his policy positions, which is a step that we hope other candidates will emulate. [READ MORE]
Of all the candidates, little is yet known about what they actually stand for. That is because, so far, their statements have been largely about the candidates themselves, rather than what policies they would implement if elected. [READ MORE]
The Zurich debate between Lobsang Sangay and Tenzin Namgyal Tethong shows stark differences. [READ MORE...]
The essence of Lobsang-la’s article is that the Tibetan voting process should be made easier. Some of his suggestions are good, but some seem politically naïve. [READ MORE...]
A troubling issue is Dolma-la's assertion that the success of Tibetan refugees is -- and should be -- based on foreign hand-outs rather than their own hard work. [READ MORE...] |
posted Feb 21, 2012 6:23 PM by The Tibetan Political Review
[
updated Feb 22, 2012 8:56 AM
]
By the Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review In a strange coincidence, February 14 saw articles on both Lobsang Sangay, the Tibetan prime minister in exile, and Wen Jiabao, the Chinese prime minister, making statements on the self-immolation crisis in Tibet. We take a close look at how the words chosen by both prime ministers reveal insights into their approaches on the issue.
The Tibetan Prime Minister According to AP’s report of its interview, the Tibetan prime minister spoke about how China has sealed off Tibet. Sangay also described his view of why the self-immolations are taking place:
“You can’t have hunger strikes, you can’t have demonstrations, you can’t write petitions [in Tibet]. Given such repressive policies and actions, Tibetans are pushed to the brink of desperation. They are thinking that perhaps this form of action will bring some attention to the grievances of the Tibetan people.”
Essentially, Sangay explains the self-immolations as acts of “desperation” motivated by seeking global “attention”. It is wonderful that Sangay’s interview was carried by AP, bringing prominent coverage to this issue of the sort that the previous Tibetan exiled prime minister probably would not have received. At the same time, for two reasons, his interview contained statements which have implications that are unfortunate or potentially unhelpful.
First, it is detrimental to portray such utterly selfless acts of resistance as merely acts of “desperation”.** Desperation necessarily comes from despair. While it would be arrogant for anyone to presume to know what was in the minds of these courageous individuals, we do not hear desperation when listening to Lama Sopa’s recorded last words, a hauntingly powerful call for Tibetan nationhood. We do not see desperation when Ani Palden Choetso calmly raised her hands in prayer as she was engulfed in flames. In our view, therefore, the word “desperation” diminishes the deep sacrifice and meaning of these self-immolations. It falsely turns a powerful act of Tibetan resistance into a sign of Tibetan despair and helplessness. This goes to the question of whether Tibetans in Tibet are passive victims, or agents with the power to change their own destiny. Certainly the Central Tibetan Administration must take care to not be seen as encouraging more self-immolations. But just as certainly, it owes it to courageous Tibetans to respect rather than diminish their sacrifice. Second, it seems simplistic to describe the self-immolations as motivated by seeking global “attention”. Again, we do not presume to know the minds of those brave individuals. However, based partly on our own direct and indirect contacts in Tibet, many Tibetans in Tibet have a sophisticated understanding that the “free world” will not ride to Tibet’s rescue. In Tibet there are no cries of “ U.N.O. we want justice”. Under this more expansive view, the self-immolations may bring outside attention, but that is secondary. Primarily, the self-immolations unify the Tibetan people, including those who were lulled into a false sense that the political status quo might be acceptable. The self-immolations also drive home to the Chinese regime that the Tibetan people will not give in, and force the Chinese people to confront the reality that the Tibetan people are not Chinese, and never will be. If these are the goals, then there is a powerful strategy at work. These apparent goals are based on a more complete understanding of true front lines of the Tibet-China struggle. These goals are also separate from raising global “attention”, which is important but completely inadequate to solve the core issue of Tibet. The Chinese Prime Minister Wen’s statement on the self-immolation crisis is mainly important because it is the highest-level Chinese statement on the issue to date. He mostly stuck to the standard boilerplate, with statements like "We respect and protect Tibet's ecological environment and traditional culture, respect and protect religious freedom in Tibet," and that Tibet is an "inseparable part" of China which the government has made great efforts at developing.
Interestingly, however, Wen also stated that "Our Tibetan countrymen are an important part of China's family of ethnic groups. They are our brothers." This demands the question: Why did Wen feel it was necessary to make this defensive statement? Note that Tibetans are “they”, in contrast to “our” which presumably refers to the Chinese people. Even if, in Wen’s view, Tibetans “belong” to China, he does not portray them as really Chinese. (See the discussion above regarding the self-immolations strategically driving this point home.) Wen also purposely tries to limit the discussion to the immolation of “a small number of monks”, to reduce the measure of the crisis. Setting aside his omission of nuns, former monks and former nuns who were part of the lay community, Wen also notably ignores the February 3 self-immolation of three lay herders in Serthar. Wen also ignores the demonstrations in Yushul, Nangchen, Drango, and elsewhere, where hundreds if not thousands of lay Tibetans took to the streets in resistance. ConclusionWen Jiabao’s attempt to minimize the self-immolation crisis in Tibet is unsurprising. His attempt to cover up the extent of the resistance is to be expected, and not much more needs to be said on this. As for Lobsang Sangay’s statement, the prime minister should be acknowledged for being far more active in public diplomacy than his predecessor. However, we are disappointed that the prime minister raised only the goal of international “attention”, ignoring the far more significant strategic developments in strengthening Tibetan unity and forcing a shift in Chinese perceptions. In this sense, the Tibetan people in Tibet are taking the lead, which we hope the Central Tibetan Administration will eventually follow for the good of the entire Tibetan movement. Because of these significant strategic developments, we believe that the self-immolations should be portrayed, not as acts of helpless despair, but as courageous acts of active resistance. -- ** For a more detailed look at the word "desperation", see "Beacons of Resistance, not Desperate Acts" by Christophe Besuchet.
|
posted Feb 13, 2012 7:01 AM by The Tibetan Political Review
[
updated Feb 13, 2012 7:03 AM
]
By the Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review
With the self-immolation crisis spreading and Tibet under undeclared martial law, Chinese propaganda can be unintentionally revealing. It shows what the Chinese regime is concerned with, trying to cover up, or having a hard time dealing with.
First, we see that the Chinese regime is so threatened by the Tibet protests -- or so unable to put together a unified and coherent response -- that it is failing to implement its own revised propaganda strategies. According to Newsweek, after the 2009 demonstrations in Xinjiang/East Turkestan, Chinese authorities implemented a more sophisticated propaganda plan:
[Xinjiang in 2009] remains open to foreign journalists, a sign that Beijing has learned media-management lessons from the globally hostile coverage it got for barring reporters in Tibet [in 2008]. The day after the Urumqi bloodshed, the State Council Information Office set up a Xinjiang Information Office in Urumqi to assist foreign reporters. It went further, inviting foreign media on a trip to Xinjiang to tour the riot zones, visit hospitals, and see the damage for themselves. Journalists were given CDs loaded with photos and TV clips. "They try to control the foreign journalists as much as possible by using this more sophisticated PR work rather than ban[ning] them," says Xiao.
In Tibet today, however, Chinese authorities have reverted to old methods of control, which in the memorable Chinese phrase is “close the door, beat the dog” (bimen dagou). This shows that something is very, very wrong in Tibet. The Chinese authorities in Tibet are in far more chaos than they let on.
Secondly, the official Chinese reports from Tibet hint at some of the problems that China is trying to cover up. For example, a China Daily article from February 9, 2012 entitled “Lhasa Crowded With Pilgrims” operates under the propaganda tactic best described by the line from Hamlet: “The lady doth protest too much, methinks.” Generally, one can assume that if Chinese propaganda tries to portray a certain situation, the opposite is true.
For example, the China Daily article rather laughingly describes how Lhasa is full of Tibetan pilgrims from as far away as Gansu Province (i.e. Amdo). This directly contradicts confirmed reports that Lhasa is currently being emptied of non-residents. According to Radio Free Asia:
"Any migrants in Lhasa have been placed under surveillance as of [Tuesday]," Jampel Monlam said. "Any Tibetans from outside Lhasa who haven't got a temporary residence permit are being thrown out of the city."
"Some of them are being transported back to [Tibetan] areas of Qinghai and Sichuan."
He said some Lhasa-based Tibetans had also been detained, apparently as a precaution. "They are probably afraid that there will be some kind of political problem."
Perhaps even more interestingly, the China Daily article has a rather comical description of how a Tibetan pilgrim lost his son, and “noticed a police station” that was coincidentally near the Tsuklhakhang square. Apparently the friendly police helped the father find his child within an hour; truly a “serve the people” moment.
The article does not mention that there are several police installations in and around the Tsuklhakhang square that replace one that was repeatedly burned down during the pro-independence demonstrations of the 1980s.
The article does, however, mention a curious list of ways that the police are “straining” to help so many visiting Tibetan pilgrims. Apparently, the police are “on duty 24 hours a day to keep order and provide hot water, medicine, wheelchairs and fire extinguishers.” Fire extinguishers? That’s right; the China Daily has admitted that security forces in Lhasa are on duty around the clock with fire extinguishers. Could this have anything at all to do with the self-immolation crisis?
Reading this Chinese propaganda between the lines, one can only guess the answer is yes.
|
posted Feb 5, 2012 11:56 AM by The Tibetan Political Review
[
updated Feb 6, 2012 6:50 AM
]
By the Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review
“What is the sound of one hand clapping?” This Zen Buddhist koan is sometimes cited by those who follow the ups and downs – mostly downs – of the Sino-Tibetan dialogue. The Tibetan side wants to negotiate a political resolution; the Chinese side either refuses to discuss anything beyond the personal status of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, or refuses to even acknowledge that there is a dialogue.
Now, there are two questions of new urgency that Tibetans must address in relation to the future of this dialogue. First, Tibetans must clarify internally who will decide Tibetan policy on the dialogue process and control the envoys. Second, Tibetans must decide how to respond externally to China’s growing intransigence in restarting talks.
The first question is illustrated by a November 2011 statement by Lodi Gyari, the Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The second question is illustrated by some December 2011 statements by Zhu Weiqun, the Communist Party official responsible for the Tibet talks.
Besides these two main topics, the end of this editorial has some new questions for future consideration by the Tibetan people.
Tibetans’ Internal Question: Who Decides, Who Controls?
Gyari’s November 11 statement declared:
“With the changes in the CTA’s structure, the Kashag [Cabinet] informed me in May 2011 of its intention to appoint me to a position under it... I responded by reminding the Kashag that I had retired from the CTA civil service long time back… Following the recent changes in the governance system, I have ceased any involvement with issues relating to the Central Tibetan Administration.” While this may seem out of the blue, it followed the devolution of power from His Holiness to an elected leadership. Gyari noted that with the devolution, he could no longer operate as essentially the CTA’s envoy as well as His Holiness’s. (This problem would have been prevented if His Holiness had remained ceremonial head of state as advocated by some.)
A close reading of Gyari’s statement also suggests that his position as Special Envoy did not automatically end when His Holiness devolved his powers. Legally, this may be a solid argument. Gyari was appointed as His Holiness’s envoy in the early 1990s through the then-proper procedure, i.e. nomination by the Kashag and formal appointment by His Holiness. His Holiness remains His Holiness. Thus, Gyari’s term as Special Envoy arguably continues until his resignation or removal by His Holiness.
1. What Went On?
The Kashag’s May 14, 2011 statement, to which Gyari refers, announced that Gyari and his colleague Kelsang Gyaltsen “will hold their posts until further notice.” The Kashag’s announcement took for granted that it has the power to appoint (or dismiss) Gyari.
Gyari’s response apparently was to “remind” the Kashag that it had no such power over his position. However, it is also important to note that this reminder was apparently delivered in private, as implied by a close reading of Gyari’s statement. Gyari did not say anything publicly until November 11.
On August 8, Lobsang Sangay formally took the reigns as Prime Minister of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. During his first press conference that same day , he declared, "We will appoint an envoy in the name of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and send him or her to Beijing to talk about the substantive issues." Thus, it was announced in a prominent public forum that Sangay intended to appoint an envoy (presumably but not necessarily Gyari) who would wear two “hats”: one as the CTA’s envoy, and one as His Holiness’s envoy.
On October 13, Sangay further stated his “firm commitment in finding a mutually acceptable solution in the spirit of the Middle-Way Approach. I have therefore asked the two envoys of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to make efforts to resume the dialogue at the earliest convenience.”
Gyari’s statement came on November 11. Essentially, he declared that he does not work for the Tibetan Government-in-Exile.
2. What Now?
We believe that the elected Tibetan leadership should be in charge of the dialogue process to the maximum extent possible. The leadership has the popular mandate from the electorate, and they also can be held accountable for the success or shortcomings of their policy. The problem comes with defining what is the “maximum extent possible”.
In an ideal world, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile would decide dialogue policy, and would appoint and instruct the representatives to any talks that take place. However, this is not an ideal world.
The reason is that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) categorically refuses to talk with Tibet’s exiled government. (Note: the Tibetan dialogue is with the United Front Work Department of the CCP, not the Chinese government. The CCP also has a Tibet Work Coordination Group where the United Front has a major voice.) Simply put, the CCP is afraid of implying any sort of legitimacy for the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, because it knows that its own rule over Tibet comes only through force. Tibetans should always be mindful that the real cause of the democratic deficit in the dialogue process is the CCP’s immature and intransigent attitude, not any power contest internal to the Tibetan side.
It is also important to note that the formal policy of the U.S. government is also to support negotiation between Beijing and “the Dalai Lama or his representatives”. Because the U.S. executive branch does not recognize the exiled Tibetan government, it acknowledges no Tibetan government role in the Sino-Tibetan dialogue.
A. Who Decides the Dialogue Policy?
From an internal Tibetan perspective, there may be a cooperative solution to these non-ideal circumstances. The exiled administration will recognize that His Holiness retains unparalleled devotion inside Tibet, and the CCP will only talk (if at all) with His Holiness’s envoys. Yet at the same time, the elected Tibetan leadership holds the popular electoral mandate, and is the legal continuity of the sovereign government of Tibet.
Thus, at the level of deciding dialogue policy behind closed doors, it makes sense for the exiled leadership to informally coordinate with Gyari and other officers in the Ganden Phodrang Trust (previously called His Holiness’s Private Office). This may already occur through the mechanism of the Task Force, though we have no inside information.
The parties involved might consider refraining from public statements about who is in charge. This admittedly hurts democratic accountability, and maybe pride, but it might be the price of dealing with an anti-democratic CCP.
B. Who Controls the Envoys?
The next question is: who should have the power to appoint and direct the envoys? When the exiled government insisted that it controls the envoys, it asserted itself as the legitimate representative of the Tibetan people. The danger, however, is that the CCP will seize on the excuse to petulantly reject all further talks. Indeed, it is our speculation that Gyari’s November 11 statement sought to repair some damage by refuting the exiled leadership’s assertions of control.
Now, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile must choose a better balance between principle and pragmatic flexibility. It could continue to claim power over the envoys, resulting in a deadlock, or it could embrace flexibility, potentially opening up diplomatic possibilities (but with an opponent who states that it is unwilling to discuss anything of substance).
Specifically with respect to Gyari, the exiled government must also make a decision. It can continue to claim power over his position or perhaps state that Gyari is only His Holiness’s private envoy, competent to discuss only issues related to His Holiness. Or alternatively, it can alter its position and acknowledge Gyari as His Holiness’s envoy, who is also competent to represent the Tibetan side in any dialogue, with no public role for the exiled government.
If the exiled government takes a more flexible route, this would not mean it renounces its claim to be the legitimate representative of the Tibetan people. It would be entirely appropriate for the government to ask His Holiness and his envoys to take on the formal role of representing the Tibetan people in dialogue with the CCP. Other governments have turned to distinguished persons to resolve conflicts. As stated above, the exiled government could continue to quietly consult with His Holiness’s envoys behind closed doors, and devote its public energies to the equally vital task of domestic improvement and societal resource-building.
From the constitutional perspective, the Tibetan Charter is notably unclear as to whether the Kashag has a role in the appointment of the next Special Envoy of His Holiness (note again that Gyari’s role probably continues until his resignation or removal). The amended Article 1(3) gives His Holiness the right to “give the title/position of envoy of His Holiness to the Kashag-appointed Office of Tibet Representatives/Envoys and Special Envoys.” From the Tibetan text, it is unclear whether it is only an Office of Tibet Representative who is “Kashag-appointed”, or also a Special Envoy: kashag gyis bsko-'dzugs byes-pai' sku-tsab don-chod dang dmigs-sel sku-tsab. Depending on whether or not the ambiguous language was intentional, this clause’s drafting was either masterful or negligent. In any case, the Charter is not much help in resolving this question.
The overall choice between principle and flexibility, deadlock and pseudo-dialogue, is one that the Tibetan people should carefully consider. This much is clear: if the Tibetan people want to seek dialogue with the CCP, it will likely be fatal for the exiled government to continue to claim to be in charge. Whether the Tibetan people decide that it is worth this price is another question, for the sake of a dialogue that may or may not happen, and which may or may not go anywhere. There is no easy answer for a people who have compromised and given up so much already, and for whom dialogue may hold out only a thin hope, one that has been dashed so many times before.
Tibetans’ External Question: How to Respond to China?
As if the dialogue process were not hard enough, the Tibetan people face an opponent who has repeatedly claimed that it is uninterested in talking (ideal for establishing a strong bargaining position). The Chinese side is led by a Communist Party official named Zhu Weiqun (vice-director of the CCP’s United Front Work Department).
Comrade Zhu has recently made some rather acerbic and inflammatory statements, which is what one would expect from scorched-earth Chinese negotiating tactics. Indeed, it is perhaps unsurprising that he uses the language of a leftist hack, since so far it has worked. To date it has been the Tibetan side that has given all the concessions, which strengthens the Chinese position and weakens the exiled Tibetan government in its domestic constituency. Presumably, Comrade Zhu has enjoyed some bureaucratic rewards for that.
In relation to the self-immolation crisis in Tibet, Comrade Zhu noted in December that “I can honestly say to our friends that even if such a thing happens again, the direction of the Chinese government’s policies in Tibet and our attitude toward the Dalai clique’s struggle will not change in any way.”
He declared categorically that China would never speak with the CTA, arguing that it "lacked legality". He also blamed “interference” by the Kalon Tripa for the failure of the talks to restart, likely referring to the envoy issue.
Speaking to European Parliament members in December, Comrade Zhu complained about Europeans being willing “to accept what the Dalai Lama says rather than what we are saying”. However, in a comment lacking any sense of civility, he stated that there is “little we can do to change this mentality but the thing I would say is that time is on our side.”
So how should the Tibetan side respond to a dialogue “partner” who declares that his side will never change their policy, will never talk with the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, and intends to simply outlive His Holiness?
This is a discussion the Tibetan people should have. Among the related questions that need asking:
- Should Tibetans carry on as before, asking the CCP to restart talks led by Comrade Zhu? One should doubt the prospects for a negotiated solution under Comrade Zhu. A Canadian intelligence commentary calls United Front work “China’s version of psychological warfare”: it serves to co-opt non-Communist leaders and use them to neutralize CCP critics, including among ethnic and religious groups. The Tibetan envoy is currently faced with the near-impossible task of seeking modification of the very “ethnic” policies designed by the United Front itself. Presumably, any United Front official concerned about his career would not repudiate his department’s own work. From the perspective of bureaucratic interest, there is a problem expecting the “anti-splittist” bureaucracy to resolve the very issue that its power and resources are based upon. On the contrary, Comrade Zhu’s interest is likely in fulfilling his mission to protect the Party, guarding his department’s policy decisions and bureaucratic prerogatives, and advancing his career, not in solving a larger problem in the interests of the Chinese and Tibetan people.
- Should Tibetans push for a good-faith (or less bad-faith) dialogue partner other than Comrade Zhu, perhaps someone in the CCP Politburo Standing Committee or the government’s State Council? The CCP’s United Front department has historically dealt with Hong Kong and Taiwan, but China’s State Council also formally or informally has offices that manage relations with those territories. Couldn’t there be a similar State Council office to institutionalize the Tibet dialogue and transfer the process away from the very department who bureaucratically benefits from continuing the “anti-splittist” crusade: i.e. the leftist United Front department? For Tibet, whether this unlikely change becomes possible may indicate how serious the Chinese side is about actually resolving the issue.
- Should Tibetans say “we tried”, and state that they remain open to dialogue but that the Chinese side is unwilling to reciprocate? By honestly acknowledging the impasse, would this open up the discussion to considering other options, including reasserting Tibet’s claim to sovereignty and independence for a reinvigorated long-term freedom struggle? Certainly, the experiences of numerous countries like Lithuania and East Timor serve to remind that all empires crumble, and there are many ways for small colonized nations to lay the groundwork to seize such an opportunity if they wish.
- Should Tibetans consider a really “outside the box” idea? What about accepting a division between the questions of His Holiness’s personal status and the political situation in Tibet? Previously, His Holiness has always stated that the real issue is the 6 million Tibetan people, which the Chinese side always rejected. With the devolution of power, the responsibility for the 6 million Tibetan people primarily rests with the Tibetan Government-in-Exile (though His Holiness remains the spiritual leader and source of refuge). Now, with the exiled government carrying on the political struggle, is His Holiness free to consider under what circumstances he would be willing to return to Tibet, separate from the issue of reaching a permanent political solution? Since the CCP says they will only discuss His Holiness’s status and return, how would the dynamics change if His Holiness’s reply as a private citizen was to take China up on its offer?
Conclusion
Certainly, there are sensitive issues involved here, and officials in the Tibetan Government-in-Exile and Ganden Phodrang Trust will (or should) speak cautiously. However, nothing should stop the Tibetan people from debating this topic, since the dialogue process is carried out from the Tibetan side in their name.
The Taiwanese experience shows that democratic debate is possible even on “sensitive” issues dealing with China. Taiwan and China have developed the so-called “1992 Consensus”, which sidesteps (some would say obscures) the dispute by allowing both sides to pretend that they are the “real” China. Neither government will admit openly that this is a bit of a word game, but the Taiwan-China agreement works even with open discussion and criticism by the Taiwanese people. Indeed, the journal Foreign Affairs even reports that Taiwanese officials “privately acknowledge the absurdity” of the consensus, which is a “kind of mantra the Taiwanese government must chant in order to have good relations with China”. Surely, there is a lesson somewhere in there.
In the Tibetan case, this editorial doesn’t claim to have any answers, and merely poses some questions that we believe are important to ask. Furthermore, we take no position on what outcomes we support. Instead, we have tried our best to present the issues as we see them, and their logical consequences, based on publicly-available information. These are difficult issues requiring sustained democratic discussion by the Tibetan people. Hopefully at the end of this discussion lies a better policy and a stronger democracy.
|
posted Jan 24, 2012 6:29 AM by The Tibetan Political Review
[
updated Jan 24, 2012 9:09 AM
]
By the Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review
Declassified documents from 1950 through the 1960s show that Canada considered Tibet to be “qualified for recognition as an independent state.” These documents also show how the Canadian government’s concern over the outcome of United Nations votes led Canada to publicly avoid the question of Tibet’s political status in favor of human rights. But while Canada downplayed Tibet’s political status, it also accepted that the issue of human rights includes the Tibetan people’s right to self-determination.
Canada’s Views on Tibet’s Independent Statehood
One of the most important documents is a November 21, 1950 cable from Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Canadian Ambassador in Washington DC (another identical cable was sent the same day to the head of the Canadian delegation to the United Nations). The Secretary of State discloses that the department’s Legal Division had asked and concluded:
“The question is, should Canada consider Tibet to be an independent state, a vassal of China, or an integral portion of China. It is submitted that the Chinese claim to sovereignty over Tibet is not well founded. Chinese suzerainty, perhaps existent, though ill-defined, before 1911, appears since then, on the basis of facts available to us, to have been a mere fiction. In fact, it appears that during the past 40 years Tibet has controlled its own internal and external affairs. Viewing the situation thus, I am of the opinion that Tibet is, from the point of view of international law, qualified for recognition as an independent state.”
A few days earlier, on November 16, 1950, the Canadian High Commissioner (Ambassador) in India, Warwick Chipman, wrote a cable entitled “Chinese invasion of Tibet” to Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs. Ambassador Chipman rubbished Chinese claims to Tibet thusly:
“I find it hard to see how the question of suzerainty comes into the matter. First of all the Chinese never ratified the agreement by which Chinese suzerainty but Tibetan autonomy were agreed to [the Simla Convention]. In the second place even if it had been agreed to, suzerainty is hardly the same as sovereignty, particularly when autonomy is part of the bargain. In the third place, if China owned Tibet, there would be no point in having discussions with the Tibetans about mutual relations and certainly no point in sending an army to conquer it. The sending of an army is surely a confession that the matter is not domestic.”
Even as late as March 24, 1959, internal Canadian documents considered Tibet a “country”. In a secret memorandum to Prime Minister John George Diefenbaker, an aide initialed N.A.R. stated that Tibet sometimes exhibited a “considerable degree of independence” and recently was “vaguely under nominal Chinese suzerainty.” N.A.R. went on to note that:
“After the Communist invasion of 1950 the Chinese sought to establish physical control of the country… Despite the promise of internal autonomy [in the 17 Point Agreement], the Chinese Government apparently began preparations to exert full sovereignty over Tibet.”
Canadian Internal Policy Discussions
A secret twelve-page review by the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the Canadian Department of National Defense, dated October 6, 1950, looked at Tibet’s strategic importance. The document viewed the Tibetan government under the Dalai Lama to be “loose in structure” but secure from internal threats. However it believed that Tibetan leaders have an “unrealistic” and “naïve” view of their ability to “resist aggression from any quarter”, i.e. China.
The Department of National Defense document found that Tibet’s 10,000 troops were “poorly trained and of low morale”. It believed that China would gain little economic or military benefit from occupying Tibet. However such an occupation would raise Chairman Mao’s “prestige” and “stature”, would strengthen Mao’s hand in dealing with Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru, and would “serve to divert Chinese popular interest away from Formosa [Taiwan]”. The conclusion was that the “chief strategic importance of control of Tibet by the Chinese would therefore be political”. The military authors concluded that, if Sino-Indian relations worsen and China fails to gain indirect control over Tibet, “Chinese invasion of Tibet will become virtually certain.”
The conclusion that China’s interest in Tibet was primarily political was echoed by a June 23, 1959 letter from Canada’s Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong, C.J. Small, to the Department of External Affairs. The Canadian trade commissioner noted that both the Chinese Nationalists and Communists agreed that Tibet is an “integral part of China” and that “Tibet was used as a rallying cry in an effort to unite the [Chinese] nation and divert its attention from domestic problems.”
The trade commissioner rather laudably went on to look at Tibetan attitudes towards what he referred to as “their Chinese overlords”. He concluded that, in the March 1959 Tibetan uprising, the
“Chinese were both shocked and surprised by the sudden violence of the outbreak which took place on and after March 19th. The basic cause of the latest, and all Tibetan uprisings was Tibetan dislike and distrust of their Chinese conquerors – not merely of new ideas and reforms.
Canadian Policy Meets Politics: What Happened?
When it came time to take action on the basis of Canada’s internal discussions about Tibet, Canada’s policy became timid. A confidential August 31, 1961 internal briefing discussing what would later become U.N. Resolution 1723 explained that Canada would support the resolution “on the basis of a violation of human rights” and “avoid political judgments about the international status of Tibet”. The reason for what Canada called its “moderate” position was to ensure that China’s neighbors would not oppose the resolution, and fear that a defeat of the resolution would disclose “the impotence of the United Nations.”
A cable from the Department of External Affairs to the Canadian U.N. delegation a month later, on October 1, 1959, expressed concern about the resolution language. The cable emphasized that the “issue is not one of Tibet’s autonomous or non-autonomous status, but one of the violation of basic human rights”. The cable also worried that the U.N. resolution may run afoul of Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, which forbids interference in internal affairs of a state; this is odd considering that the department’s own legal office considered China’s suzerainty – not even sovereignty – over Tibet to be a “mere fiction.”
There is also a letter from Prime Minister Diefenbaker to His Holiness the Dalai Lama, dated September 29, 1960. Diefenbaker was apparently responding to an earlier letter from His Holiness, and his short reply is courteous but noncommittal. He only says that Canada will be “receptive” to initiatives dealing with “the human rights of the people of Tibet.”
A heartbreaking reply from His Holiness to Diefenbaker, dated October 28, 1961, expressed His Holiness’s hope for Canadian assistance because Canada has “played a leading role in upholding the rights of the smaller nations of the world.” His Holiness warns that without assistance there may be “nothing left of Tibet” and “no Tibetans at all”, and states that he “would beg of Your Excellency and your Government to persuade to United Nations to adopt such measures as might bring about a peaceful end to the grim tragedy of today.”
A confidential 1964 Canadian internal briefing in preparation for the debate over the final U.N. resolution on Tibet, Resolution 2079, saw a slight change of tone for the better. It notes that:
“In previous sessions, the issue of the international status of Tibet, Chinese claims to sovereignty over Tibet, and international intervention and investigation were avoided primarily because those nations which were disturbed by events in Tibet considered that the United Nations had no means of taking effective action.”
By implication, the question of Tibet’s political status was not avoided because China’s claims to sovereignty were necessarily accepted. This was good for Tibet.
Also good, the 1964 document folds self-determination for the Tibetan people into the concept of human rights, as U.N. Resolution 1723 did three years earlier. The briefing discussed the “human rights and freedoms of the Tibetan people, especially their cultural, religious and civil liberties and their right to self-determination.” This marks one of the most useful points going forward, which is that regardless of Tibet’s political status, Canadian policy on Tibet has recognized that human rights explicitly includes the Tibetan people’s right to self-determination.
However by May 5, 1969, Canada was on the verge of recognizing the People’s Republic of China, and a confidential letter within the Department of External Affairs instructs that “publicity be kept to a minimum for any Canadian aid to [refugee] Tibetans.” The Tibet issue was to be buried in the interest of relations with China.
Final Considerations
When the Canadian government announced Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s upcoming trip to China in mid-February 2012, its news release celebrated “deepening economic ties”. The release also noted that 2010 marked 40 years of diplomatic relations between Canada and the People’s Republic of China. Nowhere was mention of issues like human rights or the self-immolation crisis in Tibet, let alone the issue of what right China has to rule what Canada once called the country of Tibet.
Perhaps Harper feels -- like Canada did at the U.N. debate five decades ago -- that Canada cannot push too hard. Perhaps Harper wishes simply to bury Tibet in the interest of relations with the People’s Republic of China, as Canada did in the May 1969 letter.
But before the Canadian government does so, it might consider the words of its own Hong Kong-based trade commissioner, C.J. Small, arguing for action back in 1959:
“[H]ad China been a member of the United Nations it would not have acted differently in Tibet but would have suffered greater embarrassment and loss of prestige than it in fact has – perhaps not immediately but at least in the long run, as the case would well have remained open for a number of years and even Communist governments which ignore external pressure at any given moment are not entirely insensitive to attrition over the long haul. The Tibetans too might have been given something to hope for. Admittedly, the failure of the United Nations to act on the Tibetan appeals of 1950 might have been regarded in some quarters as a precedent restricting the action in support of Tibet in 1959 – even if China had been a member of the United Nations Organization. However, the simple fact is that the Chinese broke the 1951 Sino-Tibetan treaty which had embodied the principle of Tibetan autonomy. Furthermore, the treaty was a dictated one made possible by force of arms – the same type of “unequal treaty” the Chinese have so often attacked and repudiated where they were the affected party. The Tibetans are therefore entitled to consideration in the United Nations which, it may be recalled, had not shrunk from taking up the case of the British in Cyprus (or the French in Algeria or a variety of similar cases) where the British (French or other) claim was not unlike that of China’s to control Tibet. The fact that salt water rather than mountain ranges intervened between the respective large and small countries is quite irrelevant. It is sometimes agreed that United Nations intervention over Tibet – even if China had been a member – would have complicated the situation and detracted from the benefits accruing from Asian disillusionment with Chinese communism. There may be some merit in this type of reasoning but if the United Nations acts only in certain cases and dodges those of an inconvenient nature its long run effectiveness will be severely restricted.”
The same could be said for Canadian principles as for U.N. action. Perhaps the Canadian government now finds it inconvenient that it once saw Tibet as a country qualified for recognition as a sovereign state, or that it viewed China’s armed entry into Tibet as an invasion. But for Canada to live up to its self-image as the “True North strong and free”, it must not forget these facts. Moreover, the Canadian government must recall that, even if its policy toward Tibet were strictly limited to supporting human rights, it has recognized that the Tibetan people’s human rights expressly include their right to self-determination.
* The declassified documents are available at: http://www.tibet.ca/_media/PDF/secret_canada_tibet_file.pdf* Please see also, The Forgotten History of Tibet's Role in Nepal's 1949 U.N. Application, by the editorial board of The Tibetan Political Review , October 3, 2011.
|
Email to a friend or share on Facebook, Twitter, etc.: |
| |
|
posted Dec 31, 2011 3:54 PM by The Tibetan Political Review
[
updated Jan 3, 2012 7:22 AM
]
By the Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review Proponents of the Middle Way policy have recently been placing increased hope on Chinese law. Exhibit A in this argument is Article 31 of the Chinese Constitution, which allows for the creation of Special Administrative Regions such as Hong Kong. The claim is that Chinese law already provides for the type of autonomy that Tibetans demand, and what’s missing is only political will from China to implement its own law.
There is a major problem with this view, unfortunately, and it is not the obvious ones of China’s lack of political will or the legal non-enforceability of the Chinese constitution.
Rather, the missing factor is that even for Hong Kong, autonomy under China’s Article 31 has always been understood to be only temporary. Hong Kong’s freedoms are scheduled to expire after a transitional period, when the territory will then be absorbed into the Chinese political system. Strangely, this factor is wholly ignored in the public analysis of whether the Hong Kong model has utility for Tibet.
Looking Closely at China’s Article 31
Article 31 was added to the 1982 Chinese Constitution for the purpose of easing Hong Kong and Macao (and possibly Taiwan) back under Chinese sovereignty. The inconvenient truth is that Hong Kong’s current status is simply a prelude to full incorporation into China. The Basic Law, which serves as Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, provides that Hong Kong’s “capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years”. This means that, come 2047, Hong Kong will no longer be protected by its autonomous arrangement.
To make certain of this outcome, the Basic Law also provides that only China’s National People’s Congress has the power to interpret or amend the law. (An almost identical basic law in Macao provides that autonomy there will also only last 50 years.) And even during this temporarily autonomous period, China has not yet followed its own legal obligation to allow universal suffrage for the Hong Kong legislature or the chief executive.
Seemingly, nothing in the words of China’s Article 31 demand that Hong Kong’s autonomy expire. But any serious scholar of constitutional law (and Chinese law, even more so) will know that law is more than the words on the page. If China’s Article 31 were intended to protect diversity, Hong Kong’s autonomy would not have what is known as a “sunset provision”. But it does.
In fact, Hong Kong and Macao are set to become normal provinces of China after a defined period of time. This shows that China’s Article 31 at its heart is not a liberal democratic autonomy mechanism. It is, rather, a strategic “gift” that China intends to take back. It is a narrowly-tailored political tool to allow the People’s Republic of China to acquire or re-acquire “lost” territories.
Hong Kong residents are starting to acknowledge the looming change that their territory will face. Suzanne Pepper, a political scientist writing in the Hong Kong Journal in 2009, explained that Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” formula should “be seen not as a permanent solution but only as a transitional arrangement leading to full political integration.” She continued:
“The moral of this story is that the two-systems solution is not what it seems from a distance. Although carefully written and promoted to obscure the endgame, Hong Kong’s Basic Law authorizes all the means necessary to facilitate integration within the national political system and that process is well advanced. Even the staid South China Morning Post has begun slipping lines about full integration by 2047 into its editorials.”
While the Basic Law is honest that Hong Kong only has a 50 years’ reprieve, the Seventeen Point Agreement that China imposed on Tibet in 1951 promised a permanent arrangement. Of course, Tibet’s nominal autonomy lasted only eight years, until 1959.
But in all cases – Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macao – autonomy was proffered by China merely as a temporary, incremental strategy. The final goal was always integration. Autonomy was never intended by China to be permanent (the Hong Kong and Macao arrangements say so explicitly, and everyone knows what happened to Tibet). Therefore, China’s strategic patience must not be confused with any sort of genuine commitment to diversity or to allowing real self-determination outside of Communist Party control.
In other words: China may be willing to wait, but ultimately it intends all temporarily autonomous territories to be integrated fully into the Motherland.
Towards a Stronger and More Realistic Policy
With this overriding Chinese policy goal, it is difficult if not impossible to conceive of a “Tibet Special Administrative Region” under China's Article 31. We believe this is the only reasonable conclusion based on even a modest understanding of Chinese politics and law. We might wish otherwise, but wishes do not make reality.
Sadly, the point seems to be lost or obscured in the arguments being made for why the Middle Way is supposedly in harmony with Article 31.
Arguing for Middle Way-Article 31 harmony is, unfortunately, wishful thinking. The mistake is in interpreting a legal clause without regard for the completely different political context, legal system, and philosophical framework in which the clause developed. It would be like reading the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment (“Congress shall make no law …abridging the freedom of speech…”) ignorant of the vast body of case law setting out when Congress can actually abridge free speech.
Given the reality of Chinese constitutional law, any autonomy under China’s Article 31 is only a temporary one, granted for the specific purpose of incrementally integrating a territory into the People’s Republic of China. That is why it is almost impossible that China would ever consider applying it to Tibet. China already “owns” Tibet, in its view. But even if the Central Tibetan Administration’s (CTA) policy were somehow successful against all odds, and China were to give Tibet a “Hong Kong deal”, then what? Tibet would just be back in the situation that it found itself in leading up to 1959, facing re-absorption by China in a set number of years. But not to worry; China will almost surely never consider such an offer anyway because it would defeat the very purpose of Article 31: more integration, not less.
Thus, it would be reasonable to say that the CTA’s attempt to link the Middle Way policy with Hong Kong’s expiring autonomy may be well-meaning, but is painfully ironic and dangerously unrealistic or naïve. We believe that open and objective debate of the pros and cons of any idea leads to better policy. Therefore we are optimistic that participation from Tibetan citizens around the world will help the Tibetan movement improve its approach. Such free debate will hopefully lead to a stronger policy in the best interests of the Tibetan people.
-- * To read more on the fate of Hong Kong after 2047, please see: China’s Hong Kong Transformed: Retrospect and Prospects Beyond the First Decade, Ming K. Chan (ed.), City Univ. of Hong Kong Press, 2008 (available online on Google Books).
|
Email to a friend or share on Facebook, Twitter, etc.: |
| |
|
posted Dec 22, 2011 6:44 AM by The Tibetan Political Review
By the Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review Recently, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile released a video on its official online TV site showing a 2008 Chinese police raid on Dodey Township, a rural area outside Lhasa, after the mass protests in Tibet:
The approximately 23 minute video shows an early morning raid where a number of Tibetans, including one elderly woman, were arrested and detained by hundreds of Public Security Bureau (PSB) police in black riot gear and paramilitary Peoples Armed Police (PAP)* in camouflage, and all armed with shotguns and riot batons. The video was filmed by the Chinese police themselves, presumably to document their actions for internal reasons. In at least one scene, a young Tibetan man is hit by Chinese police officers several times and receives a bloody nose, even though there is no evidence this man was violent or resisted arrest.
The video shows Chinese police going from house to house in systematic fashion and arresting an unknown number of Tibetans. The video ends with these prisoners apparently transported to a detention center. The fate of the Tibetan detainees in this video is unknown. The Tibetan Government-in-Exile did not elaborate on how it obtained this video but presumably it was leaked from someone inside Tibet who had access to this video.
In addition, Phayul (www.phayul.com) has published eight photographs that were originally released by Boxun (www.boxun.com). These photos are from Amdo Ngaba (Ch. Aba Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan Province). According to Kunga Tashi of the Office of Tibet (New York), a former Chinese police officer confirmed these arrests took place in 2008 and this police officer participated in these arrests. They show a large number of lay Tibetans and monks arrested and paraded in public with signs around their heads describing their alleged crimes. The photos also show hundreds of heavily armed Chinese police and paramilitary troops armed with assault rifles and shotguns patrolling streets and setting up checkpoints. These photos were first published in a Chinese official website to show how “rioters” would be dealt with, however, they were later removed. Boxun presumably preserved copies of these photos before they were removed from the official Chinese website.
The video and the photos show the extent of the security crackdown in Tibet after the mass protests in 2008 and perhaps recently in Ngaba after the self-immolations. They demonstrate the sweeping and arbitrary nature of arrests conducted in Tibet and the high level of repression against Tibetans. From these images, we can see that Tibet has become a police state since 2008 where heavily armed security forces arrest suspected Tibetan protestors and patrol streets like an occupying army. For example, more than 800 Chinese police are stationed around Kirti Monastery, where most of the monks who self-immolated are from.
The video and photos also clearly show the lack of any respect for the individual rights of Tibetans. None of the suspects in this video are informed of their rights during their arrests. Many former Tibetan political prisoners in exile have stated that during the entire time they were in custody, no one informed them of their rights nor did they have access to legal counsel. In addition, the photos of Tibetans being paraded around the town violate international laws against public humiliation of detainees and prisoners. The video also shows the Chinese security forces using a large number of armed men to arrest single unarmed individuals at a time, including one elderly woman. Their use of force seems out of proportion to the situation. None of the Tibetans arrested in this video appear to have resisted arrest or were armed or were in any way exhibited violent behavior.
Unfortunately, the video also show a number of Tibetans in Chinese police uniforms participating in the arrests. We recognize Tibetans working for the Chinese authorities do not have the right to refuse orders and risk their jobs and welfare of their families if they do not comply. Nevertheless, we would hope that Tibetans would not work for the Chinese security forces, knowing that one day they might have to arrest or harm their fellow Tibetans. But we also recognize that life under foreign occupation presents challenges and calculations that are hard to fully comprehend or judge from the safety of exile. We also recognize that the most likely source of this leaked video is a Tibetan working in the Chinese security establishment, who bravely ensured that this evidence came to light.
The video and the photos of the security crackdown in Ngaba stand in stark contrast to the images of Tibetans presented in Chinese official websites and in propaganda tours conducted by China in foreign countries. Chinese propaganda literatures always show Tibetans smiling, dancing or singing or working hard for the “Motherland.” Chinese official news like Xinhua, CCTV, and Lhasa TV never show mass arrests of Tibetans or Tibetan as prisoners except in a few cases related to stories about a few Tibetan “splittists” being convicted of crimes against “national unity.” Tibetans inside Tibet refer to official media channels as 'Tungoi Gato dang Gyalchei Chakgo' roughly meaning 'China's Joy and International tragedy'.
This recently leaked video of a police raid near Lhasa and the photos from Ngaba demonstrate the reality of Tibet today. As Tibetan Prime Minister-in-Exile Lobsang Sangay said in his inaugural address, life in Tibet is not a socialist paradise. Tibet under Chinese rule is a draconian police state where the Tibetan people live in constant fear of harassment, arrest, detention and persecution by the authorities. Anyone who has a dissenting voice is imprisoned and tortured. While the Chinese Government loudly proclaims that Tibetans have human rights, this video and these photos disprove China’s false claims.
*In the video, the men in camouflage are identified as Border Security and some of the detainees are handed over to them.
|
Email to a friend or share on Facebook, Twitter, etc.: |
| |
|
posted Dec 20, 2011 10:32 AM by The Tibetan Political Review
[
updated Dec 28, 2011 5:41 AM
]
By the Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review Speaking in Paris on November 26, 2011, the Kalon Tripa, Lobsang Sangay, commented that the first 100 days of his administration has been "one of the busiest Kashag [cabinets] in recent memory". The Tibetan Political Review posted a low-key commemoration of this 100 day mark on the actual date – November 16 – but we believed that the American custom of judging so quickly a new administration was a bit unfair or premature in the Tibetan context. However, given the Kalon Tripa’s embrace of the 100 day yardstick, we do have a few thoughts.
Any administration is judged on two main criteria: foreign policy success and domestic policy success. (Technically, busyness by itself isn’t relevant). Sangay’s first 100 days has been distinguished by the amount of time that he spent away from Dharamsala, traveling in the United States and Europe. His travels were largely focused on foreign policy: introducing himself in foreign capitals, speaking about the progress of Tibetan democracy, and of course calling for foreign support especially in relation to the self-immolation crisis.
From the perspective of domestic policy, it appears that Sangay’s administration is still getting its feet wet (one reason we didn’t initially make much of the 100 day mark). Sangay’s stated “number one priority” is education, which is why he kept the Education Department (Sherig) portfolio for himself. Public information to date indicates that he has been meeting with school principals and gathering suggestions and information.
Sangay has two signature domestic initiatives – Tibet Corps and the Tibet Policy Institute (TPI) – and he mentioned them both in his testimony to the U.S. Congress on November 3, 2011. However these initiatives have yet to be launched in public. TPI has quietly started, although so far it involves only a reorganization of existing personnel of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA).
The Kalon Tripa on the Road
During his first 100 days or so, Sangay has visited Washington DC, Zurich, Paris, Berlin, Oslo, Copenhagen, Brussels, and London. These visits have been well-covered by Tibet.net and Phayul so we won’t describe them in detail. Suffice to say that we are enthusiastic that Sangay has been taking a far more proactive approach to foreign policy than his predecessor.
In these foreign capitals, Sangay has largely shown himself to be a well-spoken and energetic representative of the Tibetan people.
As to the subject matter of Sangay’s message, it largely appears to center around two things: asking Western governments to speak out about the self-immolation crisis (the same message that Tibet Support Groups worldwide are prioritizing), and asking support for his stated goals of of “restoration of freedom in Tibet and the return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Tibet” (also widespread goals).
However there are a few important areas of concern.
First, Sangay has repeatedly made the somewhat incomplete statement that the self-immolators are calling for “freedom”, defining "freedom" as “religious, human rights and expression”. At least two of the self-immolators called for rangzen (independence), and this should not be glossed over. Moreover, regarding the self-immolators calling for rangwang (freedom), it is entirely possible that they meant freedom in the sense of political freedom, not just civil rights under Chinese rule. The one thing for certain is that none of the self-immolators faced an agonizing death in order to call for rangkyong (autonomy).
Related to this, Sangay has repeatedly stated that he “ran his election on the platform of the Middle Way [autonomy] policy” (as the CTA's official website recently put it). To our recollection, the Middle Way policy was not an issue in the recent Kalon Tripa election. Moreover, we would be surprised if all of Sangay’s voters (especially the younger ones) intended their votes to be an unabashed endorsement of the previous administration’s Middle Way policy, given Sangay’s claim to represent “change”
Second, Sangay has repeatedly stated an incorrect number of self-immolators (like others have done). In just one example, in Berlin he stated: “I have nothing but sad report. We have had 11 cases of self-immolations.” However, the courageous Tibetan blogger Woser has forcefully argued that the true number is 12 (now 13 as of December 1), because it is wrong to forget the self-immolation of Thapey in 2009. Even if Sangay had meant to qualify his statement to limit it to the past year, it makes no sense to overlook kusho Thapey’s sacrifice.
Third, the format of Sangay’s interaction with local Tibetan communities could be changed to better match the democratic ideals that the Tibetan people have embraced. The official CTA website depicted Tibetans in Paris and London having “audiences” with the Kalon Tripa. From articles, it seems like the set-up of the meetings also resembled audiences. This may seem like a minor point, but from the perspective of a democratic society, official characterization of such meetings as “audiences” is inappropriate for an elected leader.
Someone may have an “audience” with His Holiness the Dalai Lama or perhaps Queen Elizabeth II, but not with President Barack Obama. All citizens are equal in a republic. Political leaders do not suddenly become royalty or aristocrats upon their election; they are citizens who work as public servants. In our view, the word “audience” is appropriate only in relation to His Holiness and other incarnations (including Samdhong Rinpoche but only based on his religious role).
Sangay’s election campaign made repeated reference to him being a “commoner”, which we did not think was entirely helpful to Tibetan unity. Regardless, he now has a chance to bring a more common touch to the way the young Tibetan democracy operates. It may be that he did not request such meetings be set up as “audiences”, but now has a chance to strengthen Tibetan democracy by proactively ordering the elimination of such aristocratic trappings. This would be a good thing.
The Speaker and the Foreign Minister Too
Another interesting development in these first 100 days is that Sangay was touring Europe at the same time as the Speaker of the Tibetan Parliament, Penpa Tsering, and the Foreign Minister (Chidrel Kalon), Dickyi Chhoyang. Also present have been Representatives (Dhonchoe) from the relevant Offices of Tibet, although keeping a lower profile.
Tsering has been on an extended European trip from November 22 through December 15, visiting Vienna, Brussels, and Italy and meeting with parliamentarians and local Tibetan communities. (Tsering also accompanied Sangay to Washington DC in July.)
Tsering’s heightened international profile indicates the growing prominence, following His Holiness’s devolution of power, of the Speaker of Parliament. The Speaker is in some ways more powerful and subject to fewer checks than the Kalon Tripa. This shows that the Tibetan Parliament’s choice of its Speaker matters now more than ever, and is something to which Tibetan voters should pay serious attention.
Oddly, it is Chhoyang who appears to have the most limited schedule even though she is the Foreign Minister. The CTA website only lists her visit to Brussels on November 27. This is particularly strange because Chhoyang has proven to be an eloquent spokesperson, for example in her October 20 interview with Canada's CTV. Hopefully in the future, the CTA’s new Foreign Minister will get greater chances to carry out the duties of her portfolio.
Any increase in the Foreign Minister’s responsibilities should include greater power over the management of the Office of Tibet Representatives, who are in theory supposed to act as Tibetan ambassadors. In our view, Representatives should fall under the Foreign Minister, should act as professional diplomats, and should be the primary representative of the CTA in foreign capitals. The Kalon Tripa and the Foreign Minister can only occasionally visit a foreign country, and it is the Representative who should be tasked with maintaining foreign relations. It is with this job responsibility in mind that future Representatives should be chosen.
Conclusion: 100 Days and Counting…
These are just some observations that we had following the Kalon Tripa’s invocation of the 100 day yardstick. We encourage readers to send in their own articles and letters on how they think these first 100 days went, and their hopes for the coming years. Editor's Note: Voice of Tibet (VoT) conducted an interview (in Tibetan) of Kalon Tripa Lobsang Sangay on his first 100 days in office: http://vimeo.com/34162136.
An earlier version of this article incorrectly stated when Speaker Penpa Tsering recently visited Washington DC; it was July 2011, not Autumn 2011.
|
Email to a friend or share on Facebook, Twitter, etc.: |
| |
|
|